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1. Introduction  
 
This paper is concerned with the effectiveness of parliamentary political institutions in ensuring the 
stability of a nation’s public finances.  Our particular hypothesis is that the governance structure 
embodied in Canada’s parliamentary system has contributed importantly to the maintenance of 
fiscal stability over the history of the modern state.  
 
Fiscal stability both arises and is maintained, we argue, because the pure Westminster style of 
parliamentary democracy in Canada vests control over policy-making uniquely in the Prime Minister 
and his or her cabinet. To be in effective control, only a simple parliamentary majority is needed 
and, because of this, responsibility for fiscal choices can be attributed by voters directly to the 
appropriate decision-maker.  Hence the ambiguity that can arise in institutions that divide fiscal 
powers and responsibilities, and thus frustrate decisive decision-making in response to national 
problems, is avoided.  In addition, the abuse of such effective control has been minimized by 
effective political competition.  The need to maintain a constant parliamentary majority on fiscal 
(and other significant) issues exposes the prime minister to the daily competition of other political 
parties in the House, and the necessity of holding periodic elections in single-seat constituencies 
under a first-past-the-post plurality rule gives the electorate the ability to directly reward or punish 
the ruling political party for the consequences of their behaviour. Moreover, the election-spanning 
longevity of the political party  allows for the creation and enforcement of reputation, which in turn 
permits political promises to become credible and meaningful. And while the political party 
becomes the mechanism by which the inter-temporal externalities resulting from the overly-short 
time horizon of incumbent politicians can be overcome, the prime minister’s need to rely on party 
discipline and the on-going competition of other political parties defeats the tendency for the 
incumbent Prime-Minister to engage in intergenerational redistribution by running up public debt. 
 
The fact that the Government of Canada, like the central government of many other modern 
democracies, has survived for over a century without default on its public debt means that in some 
meaningful sense, long run responsibility with respect to the nation’s finances has in fact been 
achieved.  In statistical terms, this implies that we should observe the long run cointegrating 
relationship required for fiscal responsibility and long run debt to hold in Canada. (Below we show 
that this is in fact the case.)  Hence a more meaningful test of our hypothesis - that the alignment of 
decision-making and responsibility within the Canadian parliamentary system has been appropriate 
for the achievement of fiscal stability - requires the designation of specific sub-periods when the 
ideological background for political policy making changed and/or when the institutions and 
organizations for operationalizing policy varied in ways that either improved or discouraged 
responsible fiscal performance. Thus we look for evidence of loss of fiscal stability in periods when 
it has been argued that potentially destabilizing ideational factors (such as Keynesianism) were 
adopted, when innovations in economic institutions, such as the adoption of central banking and 
the more contemporary adoption of inflation targeting either confounded or enhanced responsible 
policy choices, and when periods of minority government potentially interfered with normal 
governance structures.   
 
Canada is a particularly useful country in which to study fiscal responsibility and the stability of 
national debt because the fundamental political institutions embodied in its Westminster style 
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parliamentary democracy have remained largely unchanged for the roughly 140 years since 
Confederation in 1867.  In addition, there is good data for most of that time period. Hence in 
Canada we find a time series long enough to make equilibrium analysis meaningful while providing 
enough natural variation in ideational and institutional factors to allow a test of a number of 
hypotheses that suggest reasons for divergence from the long run.   
 
The natural breaks we consider include: the founding of the Bank of Canada in 1935; modifications 
to the responsibility of the governor of that bank to political authorities in 1961 following the firing 
of the governor James Coyne; the adoption of Keynesian policy ideas in Canada in the post-WW2 
period); and the advent of inflation targeting in 1991.  Finally, we consider the effect on financial 
stability of minority governments -there have been 14 minority governments among the 40 
parliaments since the founding of the modern state in Canada in 1867.     
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 of the paper we consider a number of 
potential factors, categorized according to the broad rubrics of ideas and institutions, that might 
have been expected to have affected budget stability.  In Section 3 we provide graphically some 
basic statistical information about the nature of federal fiscal policy in Canada since 1870.  Section 4 
then presents our main empirical findings. The analysis builds on earlier work by Winer and Ferris 
(2008) who show that Keynesian ideas did, in fact, influence fiscal policy in Canada, and Ferris, Park 
and Winer (2008) who utilize long run cointegration analysis to study the size of government in 
Canada.  Our strongest result is that contrary to some public choice hypotheses and despite short 
run episodes of potential divergence, public expenditure and tax revenue of the Government of 
Canada appear to be in balance over the long run. This means that the adoption of Keynesianism by 
Canada following WW2, which may have led to the enlargement of government relative to GDP, did 
not impede the ability of the state to maintain fiscal responsibility and stable public finances.  In 
addition, we find no clear evidence that the introduction of a central bank (or later changes in the 
nature of its accountability to political authorities) had any long run negative impact on fiscal 
responsibility. The introduction of inflation targeting following 1991, however, did improve policy 
making and financial stability. Finally we find that greater electoral competition, measured as 
periods of minority government, did impose greater restraints on spending and resulted in greater 
fiscal responsibility. This mirrors the earlier findings of findings of Ferris, Park and Winer (2008) for 
Canada and Winer et al (2008) for the U.S. that larger majorities and unified party control 
(independent of party affiliation) loosens fiscal restraints and increases government spending.  
 
 
2.  Ideational and Institutional Factors that Alter the Ability of National Governments to 
Maintain Long Term Budgetary Stability  
 
The central empirical question for this paper is whether or not, over a roughly 140 year period, 
Canadian federal budgets have generated a stochastic pattern of deficits that are consistent with 
the long term stability of Canada’s federal government debt as a fraction of GDP.  It is important to 
emphasize three things about this central concern.  First, although budget deficits and the resulting 
change in debt is a product of the divorce between spending and tax income in the short run, our 
focus is the long term level of debt relative to Canada’s growing GDP and not the size of 
government itself (measured either in terms of taxes collected or monies spent).  Second, we are 
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interested in the existence or non-existence of a long run equilibrium and only coincidentally in 
shorter term patterns.  We recognize, of course, that there can be periods of budget surplus or 
budget deficit, but it is not surpluses or deficits per se which are our primary concern.  Rather our 
attention is focused on whether or not accumulated deficits grow as a share of GDP.  It is a growing 
share of GDP that represents a time path that is not sustainable whereas growing deficits that are a 
fixed share of GDP could well be sustainable.  Third, while we seek to answer whether or not there 
is long term equilibrium in debt level as a share of GDP in Canada, we are more interested in factors 
that might have impacted the ability of national governments to maintain long term budgetary 
stability by altering the accountability of government for its fiscal choices. We will characterize such 
factors as either ideational or institutional.   
 
2.1  Ideational Factors 
 
The key ideational factor whose importance we will assess is that of Keynesianism. The standard 
Public Choice view of the effects of Keynesian ideas, based largely we believe on evidence from the 
United States, is that Keynes has had a pernicious effect on how governments behave with respect 
to the economy (see, notably, Buchanan and Wagner, 1977).  Here the central argument is less that 
Keynes was wrong in his macroeconomic theories, or that he was misunderstood by practitioners 
(though both those points have been made), but rather that Keynes provided the intellectual 
“cover” that gave legitimacy to the self-serving behaviour of politicians.  The Keynesian view that 
governments have a broader economic mission than merely providing a rule of law to permit free 
men to organize free markets, along with the more specific Keynesian injunction requiring 
governments to adopt counter-cyclical intervention to “jump start” the economy, is said to have 
allowed politicians to “grow government”, thus justifying higher spending and the taxes to feed that 
spending.  The combination then provided a justification for deficits as an engine of economic 
growth that quickly became abused. In Buchanan and Wagner’s words (1977: 99), the acceptance of 
Keynesian ideas introduced a bias toward “larger government” and an “inflationary bias.” 
 
The allocative bias stems from the proposition that, if individuals are allowed to finance 
publicly provided goods and services through borrowing rather than through taxation, they 
will tend to ‘purchase’ more publicly provided goods and services than standard efficiency 
criteria would dictate. The inflationary bias stems from the proposition that, for any given 
level of public goods and services, for any size of the budget, individuals will tend to borrow 
rather than to undergo current taxation. … The first bias entails the hypothesis that, 
because of government borrowing, government spending will be excess; the second bias 
entails the hypothesis that, regardless of spending levels, government borrowing will be 
excessive.    
 
It is important to emphasize that, even for Buchanan and Wagner (1977), Keynes’s notion of 
counter-cyclical behaviour by governments would not, in and of itself, lead to higher debt in the 
long term. This is because government would undertake the opposing counter-cyclical actions in 
good times.  Good times would bring about spending reductions and/or tax increases (leading to 
budget surpluses) in the same way that bad times would be met with higher spending/lower taxes 
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and budget deficits.  Thus if a government truly followed Keynesian counter-cyclical prescriptions, 
the long run would result in a pattern of surpluses and deficits that on average balanced.1   
 
However unlike the “hyper-rational” Chicago School of economics, Public Choice theorists have 
always been sensitive to the foibles and cognitive limitations that affect the ability of voters to 
consistently discern and act in their own self-interest. In addition they emphasize the consequences 
of decisions made by self-interested politicians rather than simply exploring the consequences of a 
benevolent state maximizing an idealized social welfare function. To explain why Keynesianism has 
in their view proved so pernicious a factor in democratic politics, Buchanan and Wagner (1977: 93-
94) emphasize a fundamental asymmetry in the motivations of self-interested politicians to follow 
the two sides of Lord Keynes’s advice.  
 
Elected politicians enjoy spending public monies on projects that yield some demonstrable 
benefits to their constituents.  They do not enjoy imposing taxes on these same 
constituents.  The pre-Keynesian norm of budget balance served to constrain spending 
proclivities so as to keep governmental outlays roughly within the revenue limits generated 
by taxes.  The Keynesian destruction of this norm, without an adequate replacement, 
removed the constraint. Predictably, politicians responded by increasing spending more 
than tax revenues, by creating budget deficits as a normal course of events.  They did not 
live up to the apparent Keynesian precepts; they did not match the deficits of recession with 
the surpluses of boom. 
 
Similarly to explain how politicians can run up unsustainable budget deficits without being punished 
at the polls by unhappy voters, Buchanan and Wagner (1977: 99-100) appeal to a fundamental 
asymmetry in how voters see budget deficits versus surpluses. To reduce a deficit requires either a 
tax increase or a cut in public spending.  In either case, there will be losers: ”If taxes are increased, 
some persons in the community will have their disposable incomes reduced. If public spending is 
reduced, some current beneficiaries of public services will be harmed.” In contrast, the benefits of 
maintaining budget surpluses are much less direct and much more problematic. Thus Buchanan and 
Wagner (1977: 100) argue that even if the public is familiar with the Keynesian argument about the 
role of budget surpluses in reducing inflationary pressures, “[the] direct and indirect consequences 
impact quite differently … on the choice calculus of typical citizens. The benefit side of the surplus 
policy is never experienced, but rather must be creatively imagined, taking the form of hypothetical 
or imagined gains from avoiding what otherwise be an inflationary history.”  Buchanan and Wagner 
(1977: 101) add other arguments as to why budget surpluses are less likely in a political democracy 
than in “a social order controlled by ‘wise men’.” They point out interest groups that anticipate 
“making economic gains from inflation;” while others that may be particularly “vulnerable to 
downward shifts in aggregate demand”.  Both would be anxious to keep government spending high.   
 
To these arguments we add the point that with a budget surplus, politicians tend to believe that 
they can achieve greater success by “handing back” the money that government has “confiscated” 
                                                        
1
 As Buchanan and Wagner (1977: 94) express this idea:”[i]t might even be said that Keynesian economics did not 
destroy the principle of a balanced budget but merely lengthened the time period over which it applied.” 
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from the people (rather than simply paying off outstanding debt).  In support they tend to argue 
that “no one is a better judge of how to spend your money than you are.”2   
 
Politicians’ supposed increased ability to borrow using the Keynesian justification of supporting 
growth in the economy, in combination with Keynes’s views about a “wider” role for government, 
and the arguments about why voters are more sympathetic to tax cuts than spending cuts, all 
support the claim that the Keynes’s influence should yield higher government spending financed by 
greater government borrowing. Or, to put it another way, since “budget deficits make it possible to 
spend without taxing“ (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977: 102), the removal of the constraint imposed 
by the balanced budget generates an asymmetry in competitive democracies in a post-Keynesian 
world.  “Deficits will be created, but to a greater extent than justified by Keynesian principles; 
surpluses will sometimes result, but they will result less frequently than required by the strict 
Keynesians prescriptions”(Buchanan and Wagner, 1977: 103). Thus, even while there were 
asymmetries in budgetary incentives based on voter and politician self-interest before Keynes, 
these asymmetries are expected to be exacerbated by the influence of Keynesian ideas.  These 
observations lead us to formulate a simple public choice hypothesis. 
 
Public Choice Hypothesis 1 (PCH1): The adoption and implementation of Keynesian ideas will lead 
to spending outstripping taxation, giving rise in the longer run to unsustainable budget deficits. 
 
In Canada one of Keynes’ early students, Robert Bryce, was instrumental in introducing The General 
Theory and Keynesianism to the Department of Finance as early as the mid-1930s. He subsequently 
served for three decades as a high ranking official in the Department, ending his career as Deputy 
Minister of Finance.  More publicly, the federal government’s White Paper on Employment and 
Income in 1945 signalled the formal acceptance of Keynesian ideas in senior Canadian policy circles 
(Government of Canada, 1945). Finally, Winer and Ferris (2008) tested whether the espousal of 
Keynesianism in the White Paper translated into policy action and found evidence of greater 
counter-fiscal activity in the data following WW2.  Hence in the tests below we use a 1946 dummy 
(0 prior to 1945, 1 thereafter) along with other necessary controls to test for evidence of whether 
greater Keynesian counter-cyclicality in the size of Canadian budget deficits and surpluses led to a 
period of greater instability in the public debt.   
 
The essence of PCH1 is that there is no effective institutional mechanism that imposes the costs of 
diverging from optimal long run behaviour back onto the appropriate decision maker.  This is 
perhaps easiest to see in the case of the U.S. where political responsibility for the budget is shared 
among the executive and the two branches of the legislature with overlapping tenures while the 
day-to-day responsibility for implementing policy is shared between the Federal Reserve System 
and the Treasury. Together they imply that the voter and the party system become less effective in 
ensuring fiscal discipline. The alternative to PCH1 is that institutional incentives do exist so that the 
future cost of short run behaviour is brought to bear on the appropriate decision maker effectively.  
In Canada, as argued earlier, parliamentary democracy and the political party structure are the 
institutions that can internalize these externalities and benefit from correcting asymmetries 
                                                        
2
 The inapplicability of this argument in general depends on the existence of public goods or merit goods, the 
coordination and free rider costs of which provide an efficiency role for government.  Interstate highway systems, 
national defence and various forms of public health/education are examples. 
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discussed earlier. More specifically, effective control over decision making is consolidated in the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet so that responsibility for the consequences of policy is unambiguous.  
Similarly political power is concentrated in the party where the election-spanning lifespan allows for 
the creation of reputation and credibility. Hence the counter-hypothesis we test in this paper is that 
the Canadian parliamentary system has overcome the coordination issues associated with long run 
budgetary processes such that long run debt has been stationary (the debt level was sustainable).  
In section (b) we expand further upon this theme in relation to minority governments.     
 
(b) Institutions 
 
The literature on the economic effects of institutions is immense and spreads over at least three 
disciplines: economics, law, and political science, with a nascent literature in sociology as well (see 
e.g., Coase, 1960; Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Komesar, 1994; Cukierman and Webb, 1995; King, 
1997; Huber and Shipan, 2002, Crisp, Moreno and Shugart, 2011, for just a flavour of the diverse 
literatures in this area).  There are a variety of common themes in the Public Choice literature on  
institutions including: (a) transactions costs analysis (Coase, 1960) of the efficiency of division 
between private bargaining/contracting and public dispute resolution processes, (b) issues of 
collective action in controlling free rider problems and providing accurate measures of demand 
revelation, (c) issues of optimal delegation –with a focus on  principal-agent relationships (see e.g., 
Huber and Shipan, 2002) and a strong  interest in the difficulties in making credible commitments,3 
(d) claims about the power of competition, whether it be political party competition or benchmark 
competition from similar jurisdictions, or U.S. states as “laboratories of experiment, ” to improve 
the efficiency of outcomes; and (e)  concern for  the structural reasons for institutional choice and 
maintenance, with a central idea being John Ferejohn’s classic formulation that “preferences for 
outcomes conditions preferences for institutions.”4  (For a discussion of the propensities for pork-
barrel spending under different types of electoral rules see Grofman, 1999.)    
 
Here we will limit ourselves to a brief discussion of two topics in this vast literature that allow us to 
develop specific hypotheses about other factors that influence the stability of budget deficits.  The 
first of these concerns the importance of having a central bank as an alternative to the government 
in providing a homeostatic control for the economy, checking both inflationary and deflationary 
                                                        
3
 Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) begin their essay on the consequences of delegation of economic authority 
to central banks with an elegant parable about the difficulty of credible commitment.  
  
4
 According to the recollection of one of the present authors (Grofman), Ferejohn said this roughly 40 years ago at 
an early conference on Public Choice.  We are not aware, however, of anywhere where this aphorism is written 
down and John Ferejohn doesn’t remember saying it.  But if he didn’t say it, he should have! 
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tendencies. Here greater independence provides a two edged sword—allowing circumvention of 
asymmetric short run cyclical political influence while at the same time dividing responsibility for 
the cycle and thus freeing the government from full responsibility for eradicating the business cycle.  
The second is the debate whether a more concentrated, centralized political authority, like single 
ownership of a “common pool” resource, improves economic efficiency or results in greater rent 
dissipation and a weakening of fiscal disciple.  
 
2.2 Central Banks 
 
As a general rule, economists are supportive of independent central banks that are as free as 
possible from political influence (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti, 1982; Cukierman and Webb, 
1995).  Isolating central bank managers from political pressure through the granting of long terms in 
office and delineating independent authority should allow managers of central banks to take a 
longer term perspective than would elected officials and thus make more responsible decisions 
involving credible commitment.  Like the “wise men” earlier referenced by Buchanan and Wagner 
(1977), central bankers would be less prone to choosing the popular over the good and hence result 
in greater long run price stability. 
 
On the other hand, greater independence also means that the coordination of monetary and fiscal 
policy action between independent bankers and political fiscal decision-makers may become more 
complicated and difficult.  Because interest rate and money supply changes influence real output in 
the short run, central bank actions necessarily impact on the plans of fiscal authorities at the policy 
level.  Moreover, because the money supply is increased primarily through central bank purchases 
of (federal) government debt, monetary and fiscal policy become intertwined operationally within 
the government budget constraint.  It follows that when both monetary and fiscal authorities view 
themselves as having responsibility for the cycle, accountability for the resulting budget deficit and 
accompanying changes in public debt will become somewhat blurred.5  With greater ambiguity and 
diminished accountability, recognized responsibility tends to be lost.  In this sense, the creation of 
an independent central bank would be expected to have a weakening effect on fiscal discipline and 
this would be predicted to result in larger fiscal deficits and hence larger levels of government debt.  
 
To understand the implications of the independence created by a central bank, we must, in our 
view, understand the reasons why political authorities might willingly surrender power to 
“technocrats” such as “bankers”. Because institutions can fulfill roles that have little or nothing to 
do with the motivations that inspired their origins, and because the single most powerful forces 
accounting for institutional continuity are inertia and an asymmetry between the nature of the 
coalition needed to put an institution in place and that needed to overturn it once vested interests  
                                                        
5
  There is now a large literature under the heading of fiscal theories of the price level that examine the constraints 
on monetary policy of a dominate fiscal policy (where monetary must compensate to keep the government budget 
constraint satisfied).  See for example, Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Leeper (1991), Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba 
(2001) and Catao and Terrones (2005).  Earlier writers explored the “unpleasant” consequences for fiscal policy 
(and government debt) of the dominance of monetary policy within the government budget constraint (Sargent 
and Wallace 1981).   
9 
 
 
in its continued existence are created,6 and  because institutions normally serve fulfill multiple  
purposes, any institution can  operate in ways that cannot be explained merely by looking to see 
what political forces supported its creation or support its continuation.  Nonetheless, recognizing 
the multiple roles that an institution such as a central bank plays in the political process gives us 
additional reasons to be sceptical of the view that a strong central bank insulated from political 
authorities will necessarily lead to better deficit control.  
 
There are at least four reasons why politicians might cede power over the economy to non-elected 
officials. 7 First is the kind of logic alluded to by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1982) in the quote 
above, namely a desire to send a credible signal of fiscal responsibility, by delegating responsibility 
to those who are better able to carry out the mission than politicians themselves. This reasoning 
suggests that politicians are well aware of the tactic used by Ulysses when faced with the lure of the 
sirens, namely stopping his ears and being bound to the mast (Elster, 1979).  According to this line 
of argument, politicians cede authority for quite laudable reasons, to better serve the public 
interest.  But rather different motivations may also apply.  A second motivation is that politicians 
cede authority to a central bank from fear.   Since the decision to tighten credit or allow inflation 
has a redistributive consequence for borrowers and lenders, politicians may “outsource” decisions 
such as these to agencies believed not to be accountable to them, to “pass the buck” in terms of 
perceived responsibility for politically unpopular choices.  Third, given the secrecy given to central 
bank actions and the absence of a need to provide public reasons for their actions, politicians may 
well believe that they can influence central bank decisions in ways that escape public scrutiny, with 
central bank authorities sensitive to the desires of their politicians who appointed them (Abrams 
and Iossifov, 2006; Abrams, 2006; and Ferris, 2008). 8    
                                                        
6
 For example, after a strict “one person, one vote” regime was implemented in the U.S. in the years immediately 
following Baker v. Carr (1962), politicians reflecting rural interests advantaged by malapportionment sought a 
constitutional amendment to remove apportionment jurisdiction from the U.S. Supreme Court. Initially it appeared 
to be considerable bipartisan support for such an amendment, but once the U.S. House of Representatives came to 
contain members elected under the new OPOV regime, the pressure to reverse the Supreme Court’s insistence on 
strict population standards for House districts essentially disappeared. 
7 The question of why political authorities cede power to central bank parallels in many ways the ongoing debate 
about what shaped the structure of  U.S. Congressional committees in ways that appear to give committees power 
that is independent of the floor majority.  The latter debate pits individual-level-benefit models of committees as 
designed to allow members of congress to engage in low cost implicit logrolls to pass legislation and claim credit in 
ways that enhance their re-election chances (Shepsle and Weingast, 1987) against models that focus on 
informational efficiencies in jurisdictional assignments that involve the accumulation of policy expertise (Gilligan 
and Krehbiel, 1990) against models that emphasize the ultimate majority party control of congress and the ways in 
which committee processes are actually structured to maintain that control (Cox and McCubbins, 1990).  Still more 
recent models emphasize the contingent nature of party dominance (conditional party governance) as a function 
of the size of party majorities, ideological dispersion within parties, and ideological separation between parties 
(Rohde, 1991; Aldrich and Battista, 2002).  Related  debates about the implications of  oversight delegation to  
judicial or administrative bodies take place in many other contexts, e.g., with respect to creating constitutional 
courts that have power of judicial review over the constitutionality of legislative acts (see e.g. Stone-Sweet, 2000). 
8
 A Wuffle (personal communication, April 1, 2011) has suggested an analogy between answers to the question  
“Why political delegation of economic authority to a central bank?” and answers to the question “Why does the 
quarterback pass the ball?  In U.S. football an obvious reason for the quarterback in U.S. football to pass the ball is 
to increase the likelihood that his team will achieve its immediate goal by scoring a touchdown. Of course, the 
quarterback only wants to pass the ball to members of his own team, i.e., those who will take the ball in the 
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A fourth related argument why politicians might cede responsibility for control of inflation and 
deflation through monetary policy, offers a more Machiavellian story (see Acheson and Chant, 
1973).  By shifting part of the responsibility for economic matters to a central bank, politicians may 
see themselves as free to spend, in anticipation not just that that they will be spared from public 
blame, but that the central bankers will work to save them from their fiscal follies. In this case our 
previous discussion of the consequence of divided responsibility is restructured in terms of moral 
hazard sought through delegation.9  This line of reasoning reinforces the argument given in PCH2, 
that is, however desirable is the passing monetary control from political authorities to central 
bankers, the consequences for fiscal responsibility will be perverse.   
 
While institutions cannot prevent undesirable outcomes nor ensure desirable ones, the way that 
decision-making authority is allocated within the public sector will make some policy outcomes 
more probable than others.  One such example concerns the assignment of authority between the 
central bank and the executive and legislative branches of government. Both economists and 
practitioners in the area of monetary policy believe that the central bank can affect primarily the 
expansion of money and credit and through them the price level and inflation rate.  No competing 
organization can exercise similar control.  Hence assigning primary responsibility for long run price 
stability to the central bank helps to ensure an institutional focus and accountability on a particular 
objective—inflation—and thus avoids the ambiguity that can arise from the pursuit of multiple 
potentially conflicting objectives. Institutionally, the Coasean prescription of assigning responsibility 
to the agent who can best affect the desired outcome increases the probability that lower inflation 
rates and more stable prices will be the realized solution.   
 
Ultimately, the central bank’s authority and scope of action depends on the government.  The 
government passes laws and follows customs that grant their central banks more or less direction, 
authority and autonomy to pursue price stability.  Narrowing the central bank’s mandate to 
maintain price stability should result in more benefit to the economy and to the government itself.  
In its own terms, an increase in directed central bank independence better allows for the creation 
of reputation as one of the means by which a government can strengthen its commitment to price 
stability (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti, 1982: 353-354). In addition, a narrowing of central bank 
focus on price stability requires less policy coordination with respect to longer run fiscal objectives.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
desired direction.  And the quarterback has to be persuaded that passing the ball increases the chance of a gain in 
yardage over his simply keeping the ball and running with it. The second argument is that the quarterback is afraid 
that if he keeps the ball he will be crushed by 300 pound linebackers -- who are only allowed to tackle him is he 
hasn’t gotten rid of the ball.  Here the linebackers are analogous to public opinion.  (A third argument is that 
passing the ball , with  the potential for visually compelling long broken field runs with the other team in hot 
pursuit, on the one hand, and the heightened suspense of risk of interception, on the other, increases the 
attractiveness of the sport to fans, and thus increases stadium and television revenues, but this argument does not 
seem to have any obvious parallel with delegation to central banks.) 
9
 A rather different  argument about undesirable aspects of delegation of final authority  to experts  have been put 
forward in the discussion of the merits of  allowing judicial authorities to make ultimate determinations of 
constitutionality.  For example, one argument by some early U.S. jurists was that allowing the Supreme Court this 
authority, however desirable from the standpoint of responsibility to the constitutional text, denied the public of 
the political education that comes from being allowed to make mistakes, having to live with their consequences 
and learning to correct them.    
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The result is a greater concentration of responsibility on the government for resulting surpluses and 
deficits.  This, in turn, should lead to greater fiscal responsibility and hence better control over 
levels of outstanding debt.   
 
Such reasoning leads to two testable public choice hypotheses: 
 
Public Choice Hypothesis 2 (PCH2):  The creation of an independent central bank weakens fiscal 
discipline and hence control over the level of government debt.   
 
Public Choice Hypothesis 3 (PCH3):   Fiscal responsibility and debt level stability will be enhanced by 
a concentration of central bank focus on price stability and strengthened by greater political 
independence.      
 
In the rankings of central bank independence given by Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti  (1982: Table 
2, p. 362), Canada is coded as having one of the strongest degrees of independence among the 21 
industrial democracies compared, with a score of .45--the sixth highest value, where the estimated 
values range from .17 (Belgium) to .69 (Germany).10 In comparison, the score given to the U.S. 
Federal Reserve is .48.  For all intents and purposes, then, there is not much difference in the  
degree of political independence given to U.S. and Canadian central banks. Hence the recent failure 
of budget discipline in the U.S. relative to Canada should make us somewhat sceptical whether it is 
only differences in political independence that explain the differential impact on deficits and debt 
over the longer run. 
 
In the particular case of the Bank of Canada, while the original architects in 1935 designed the Bank 
as a private corporation with widely distributed shares and government participation restricted to 
the appearance of the Deputy Minister of Finance as a non-voting member of the Board of 
Governors, subsequent legislation quickly reversed this separation by making the government the 
exclusive owner of the Bank’s shares (Thiessen, 2000: 3).  Even so, the role that would be played by 
the government through the Minister of Finance in the setting of policy and daily operations of the 
Bank of Canada remained both controversial and ambiguous until the Coyne Affair of 1961. In that 
episode, the inability to reconcile inconsistent monetary and fiscal policies led the then Prime 
Minister, John Diefenbaker, to fire the Governor of the Bank of Canada, James Coyne.  The refusal 
of the Senate to pass the legislation declaring the office of the Governor vacant precipitated a 
serious political crisis that resulted ultimately in the resignation of the Governor and the adoption 
of legislation enshrining the leadership of the Minister of Finance in matters of economy policy.11 
                                                        
10 We have only indicated comparisons of Canada to other industrial democracies; comparisons to the putative 
level of legal independence of central banks in the less developed world turn out to be essentially meaningless 
since the assumed legal insulation from political control is often only a “parchment barrier,” which can be 
broached if their economic concerns appears grave enough to political authorities (see esp. Figure 1 in Cukierman, 
Webb and Neyapti , 1982). 
11
 The relevant legislation reads “If, notwithstanding the consultations provided for in subsection (1), there should 
emerge a difference of opinion between the Minister and the Bank concerning the monetary policy to be followed, 
the Minister may, after consultation with the Governor and with the approval of the Governor in Council, give to 
the Governor a written directive concerning monetary policy, in specific terms and applicable for a specified 
period, and the Bank shall comply with that directive. This power has never been used. 
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Nevertheless despite the undisputed ability of the Prime Minister through his Minister of Finance to 
dictate Bank policy by “writing a letter of direction” to the Governor, Canada’s Central Bank and its 
Governor appear to enjoy a considerable degree of independence from partisan politics and the 
specific policy platform of the governing party. 
 
The resolution of who had ultimate authority to set economic policy in Canada, however, did little 
to resolve the operational issues of overlapping responsibilities and multiple, often conflicting, 
policy objectives.  The situation changed in 1991, however, when the Bank of Canada adopted 
inflation targeting jointly with the Government. This involved a formal commitment by the Bank to 
maintain price stability (as opposed to the competing objective of maintaining full employment) 
where price stability was now defined specifically in terms of a targeted range for inflation.  
 
Hence in Canada our emphasis on directed responsibility and control would lead us to predict that 
the introduction of the Bank of Canada in 1935 would have reduced the degree of direct fiscal 
responsibility by government and thus generated less control over government debt.  The formal 
resolution of the issue of ultimate political control over policy in 1961, on the other hand, would not 
have been expected to alter fundamentally the division of responsibilities for economic policy 
unlike the adoption of inflation targeting in 1991. Hence a dummy variable for 1961 (0 before 1961, 
1 thereafter) would not be expected to generate a break in any cointegration relation whereas the 
adoption of inflation targeting in 1991 did better delineate policy actions and so would be expected 
to increase fiscal responsibility.  Hence a dummy variable for the period of inflation targeting (0 
prior to 1991, 1 thereafter) would be expected to indicate better control over government debt.     
 
2.3  Cohesive single party governments 
 
Breton (1996, chap 4) emphasizes that the Canadian Minister of Finance is given broad powers in 
the economic sphere and that Canada has a strong tradition of cabinet solidarity, i.e., the cabinet is 
collectively responsible to the Government (and thus to the Prime Minister) which prevents end-
runs by spending departments around a Minister of Finance who says NO.  Also, because budgetary 
affairs are handled internally by the cabinet and within the Ministry of Finance, there is a good deal 
of secrecy about budgetary decision-making and timing of announcements, thus adding to the 
relative bargaining power of the Minister of Finance, provided he or she is backed up by the Prime 
Minister.  
 
Since it is usually single party governments controlling a majority of the seats in the Canadian  
parliament, “responsible government” in Canada is effectively “party government”.  The prime 
minister is the leader of the government, and as long as the prime minister commands the loyalty of 
his own party, this insures that the government largely speaks with a single voice on economic 
affairs.  Indeed, dissenting ministers are expected to resign.  Perhaps even more importantly, in 
Canada rather than taxation and spending being dealt with separately (as in the U.S.), they are 
considered as a package in every budget. In addition, the Prime Minister exercises a line-item veto if 
he wishes. 
 
Centralized control means that political leaders can effectively link aggregate spending and 
taxation, and single party government means that politicians can be more easily held to account by 
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the electorate for fiscal performance. This is the basis for our belief that Canada will result not be 
susceptible to the Keynesian type influences suggested in PCH1 above.  However, while the ability 
to exercise control is crucial to our argument, the size of the governing majority or the scale of its 
control is not.  Moreover the extent to which the governing party is unchallengeable in its decision-
making is more controversial.  Here we distinguish between two competing hypotheses:    
 
Public Choice Hypothesis 4 (PCH4): Single party majority party governments are more effective in 
dealing with budgeting issues than multiparty governments or ones with a minority government in 
power. 
 
Here a larger majority is viewed as simply reinforcing the argument above.  On the other hand, a 
larger majority means that the governing party faces less effective opposition, allowing it to ignore 
opposition and implement unimpeded more of its party platform.  With less parliamentary 
opposition and a greater margin to waste, parties have fewer reasons to reject the expansionist 
plans of its supporters, both in relation to spending more and taxing its supporters less.  Finally, by 
being able to running up deficits to finance public spending, the party in power might also be able 
to “buy” vote support, thus holding on to office longer, and leaving to the opposition party that 
eventually takes it place the unpalatable task of coping with a fiscal crisis whose solution has too 
long been postponed (probably also shortening the term in office of that opposition.) Winer et al.  
(2008) show that in the U.S., government, spending as a share of GDP is greatest when there is 
single party control over the institutions of government (the two chambers of the legislature and 
the presidency). Similarly, Ferris, Park and Winer (2008) show that larger parliamentary majorities 
in Canada led to increases in government spending and resulted in a larger sized government. This 
argument lead us to a countervailing hypothesis: 
 
Public Choice Hypothesis 5 (PCH5): Minority governments represent instances when political 
competition is heightened.  The centralization of policy control and responsibility in such 
circumstances results in a greater than normal degree of fiscal discipline and thus greater stability in 
public debt.     
 
3.  A Graphical History of the Canadian Fiscal System 
 
Before getting started with the econometric analysis that encompasses the issues we have outlined, 
Figures 1 and 2 and present a graphical view of the history of the Canadian fiscal system almost 
from the beginning of the modern state in 1867. In the first figure we show the variables that will 
form the core of our cointegration estimating equations: the excess of real growth over the real 
rate of interest and, as a percent of GDP, federal tax revenues, federal program spending net of 
interest payments, and the federal net of interest deficit. Figure 2 shows federal debt interest paid 
to the private sector as a percent of GDP.  
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Figure 1: Federal Fiscal Size (percent of GDP) and Excess of Real Growth Over Real Interest Rate, Canada 1870 - 2009
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Figure 2: Federal Debt Interest As Percent of GDP, 1870 - 2008
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Table Accompanying Figures 1 and 2: Government of Canada, 1870 - 2009 
 
 
We will investigate the time series properties of these data carefully in the following sections of the 
paper.  Here we simply want to draw attention to one fact, confirmed by the coefficients of 
variation in the table following the figures: that except for the excess of the real rate of GDP growth 
over the real interest rate (in the top half of Figure 1), Canadian fiscal history is obviously more 
volatile after 1945 than it was in the 19th century.  Whether this has something to do with 
Keynesianism, and whether or not this implies that the fiscal system is unstable, remains to be seen.  
 
 
4.    Empirics 
 
In this section we test the hypothesis that Canadian parliamentary democracy has resulted in policy 
choices that are consistent with fiscal responsibility in the sense that spending and tax decisions led 
to a stationary share of government debt in GDP over the long run.  We then examine whether or 
not the adoption of Keynesian counter-cyclical policies in Canada after 1945 has altered that degree 
of fiscal responsibility.  The former test arises because the long run equilibrium condition needed to 
produce a sustainable level of government debt implies a cointegration relationship for government 
deficits.  The latter test is based on the idea that if Keynesianism eroded fiscal responsibility, this 
should show up as a break in the long run cointegration relationship.   
 
The alternative hypotheses are either that Keynesianism was effective in generating greater 
counter-cyclical activity (with perhaps a once and for all increase in the long run size of outstanding 
government debt (to GDP ratio)) or that Keynesianism has had no effect at all.  Given that no 
evidence of a long run effect on debt’s sustainability by Keynes can be found, we turn consider 
whether adding another institution besides for aggregate stability—the Bank of Canada—has had 
an impact on fiscal responsibility.  The hypothesis here is that divided responsibility should lead to 
less fiscal discipline and that the resulting fiscal shirking produces a higher, less stable path for 
government debt.      
 
4.1 Method 
 
We begin from the observation that the level of debt in an economy is sustainable if the share of 
debt in aggregate income/output,   , does not grow through time (i.e.,      
 
  
 
   
  
  ).12  Then 
                                                        
12
 Note that this condition is a sufficient rather than necessary, the necessary condition being that the present 
value of government debt is zero.  The advantage of using the weaker sufficient condition is that it yields a more 
transparent testable hypothesis.  
Variable Coefficient of Variation (and Mean) 
 1870-1913 1920-1938 1950-2009 
Non-interest Spending/GDP 0.16  (0.06) 0.31  (0.08) 0.14  (0.16) 
Tax Revenue/GDP 0.07 0.11 0.07 
Deficit Net of Interest/GDP -1.20 0.87 -2.31 
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since    
  
    
, where   is the nominal level of government debt,     is the price level, and    is the 
level of real income/output, its time derivative becomes    
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The change in nominal government debt through time, 
   
  
, comes from the size of current 
government deficit, the difference between total government spending and taxes where total 
spending depends upon both program spending,   , and interest on outstanding government debt, 
    .  Government revenues come from taxation,   .  Using this definition of  
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where the first term on the right hand side, (
     
  
), is the operating or primary deficit  as a fraction 
of total debt and    and    represent, respectively, the real rate of interest and the inflation rate. 
For the share of government debt to be positive and not increasing in the long run, the growth rate 
of    must be zero, i.e.,  
 
  
 
   
  
     This in turn implies that      ̅ and that 
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Dividing the top and bottom of the left hand side by nominal income,     , we find with 
rearrangement:  
 
(
  
    ⁄ )  (
  
    ⁄ )   ̅ (
   
  
 
  
   )                                                    (5) 
 
This relationship asserts that for the share of government debt to be sustainable over time there 
must exist a particular long run relationship among three variables.  Intuitively, a deficit can be 
sustained in the long run only if the rate of growth of real output exceeds the real cost of holding 
long run debt.  For convenience, we call this last term the fiscal cost of long run debt, that is, FCOST 
= (
   
  
 
  
   ). 
 
In statistical terms, the expenditure size, GSIZE, and the tax size, TSIZE, of government have both 
risen through time and are I(1).  Hence a long run stable equilibrium relationship implies that a 
cointegrating relationship must arise between these two parts of the government’s operating 
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deficit.  On the other hand, FCOST is stationary or I(0).  Hence FCOST can be combined with the 
operating deficit only if the residual from a linear regression between the two variables in the 
operating deficit are stationary.  If this is the case then the parameter  ̅ can be inferred from the 
coefficient of FCOST in that extended linear regression.   
 
Because Keynesianism is first and foremost a set of counter-cyclical policies, testing for a long run 
relationship between government spending and taxes is complicated by the fact that the data 
observed will also incorporate those short run policy measures designed to deal with short run 
variation in economic growth about its long run path.  This could differ in degree and/or kind from 
the type of variation implied by long run policy.  Hence testing for the existence of such a 
cointegration relationship to assess the long run hypothesis that Canada’s parliamentary democracy 
has been consistent with fiscally responsibility should also account for the simultaneous appearance 
of short run counter-cyclical policy in the data.  To do this we first estimate the long run 
cointegrating relationship as part of an error correction model of adjustment to the long run.  In this 
case the condition that the residuals from the linear regression must be stationary is replaced by 
the condition that the error correction term must have a particular sign for stationarity.  In our case 
convergence requires a reduction in spending when deficits rise and a rise in taxation.  
 
4.2 Tests 
 
A. Does Fiscal Policy in Canada exhibit stability over the Long Run? 
 
The time series characteristics of and sources for the data used in our tests are presented in the 
Data Appendix found at the end of the paper. The important characteristic is that both the 
expenditure and tax shares of government in GDP are I(1) while FCOST is I(0).   
 
The analysis above then suggests that the sustainability of government debt in the long run can be 
tested for by the form and coefficients of the following OLS regression: 
 
 (
  
    ⁄ )         (
  
    ⁄ )     (
   
  
 
  
   )                                        (6) 
 
Fiscal sustainability requires the regression residuals,   , to be stationary with            and 
    ̅.   Perhaps as importantly, our analysis also suggests that this long run relationship should be 
imbedded within an error correction framework, where the error correction process allows for the 
incorporation of short run counter-cyclical fiscal policies that may incorporate more than just the 
types of variation in policies that underlie the long run.  Since short run fiscal policy differs from 
considerations spanning the long run, we include the possibility of short run counter-cyclical policy 
in the error correction part of the model. Hence our test for fiscal responsibility implies running an 
error correction model where short run changes in government expenditure that respond both to 
the size of the “error’ made incomplete adjustment to the long run and to variations in the growth 
rate (of GDP).   In Table 1 below we then present the Johansen cointegration equation and error 
correction equations for the three potentially endogenous variables.  Because WW2 generates 
abnormally large short run variations in spending, we exclude the 1940-1946 time period.   
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Table 1 
Vector Error Correction Estimates, Canada: 1876 – 2009 
(Standard errors in brackets) 
    
    Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1   
    
    GSIZE  1.000000   
    
TSIZE -0.988196***   
  (0.08752)   
    
FCOST(-1)  0.964437***   
  (0.11276)   
    
C  0.012384   
    
    Error Correction: D(GSIZE) D(TSIZE) D(FCOST) 
    
    CointEq1 -0.055493***  0.021941** -0.630447*** 
  (0.01936)  (0.01146)  (0.07728) 
    
D(GSIZE(-1))  0.464038***  0.062583** -0.142570 
  (0.06177)  (0.03655)  (0.24652) 
    
D(GSIZE(-2)) -0.085385  0.061778**  0.663875 
  (0.06683)  (0.03954)  (0.26671) 
     
D(GSIZE(-3))  0.071234  0.069948**  0.057774 
 (0.06251)  (0.03698)  (0.24945) 
    
D(GSIZE(-4)) -0.133985** -0.087636** -0.047893 
  (0.05690)  (0.03367)  (0.22708) 
    
D(TSIZE(-1))  0.067321  0.350726*** -0.013382 
  (0.15371)  (0.09095)  (0.61342) 
    
D(TSIZE(-2)) -0.240225 -0.294435*** -0.887089 
  (0.15690)  (0.09284)  (0.62617) 
    
D(TSIZE(-3))  0.351814**  0.040592  1.193730** 
  (0.14965)  (0.08854)  (0.59721) 
    
D(TSIZE(-4)) -0.243858* -0.151073** -0.318013 
  (0.12911)  (0.07639)  (0.51526) 
    
D(FCOST(-1))  0.008164 -0.029383*** -0.014948 
  (0.01782)  (0.01054)  (0.07110) 
    
D(FCOST(-2))  0.014470 -0.008898 -0.046340 
  (0.01749)  (0.01035)  (0.06980) 
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D(FCOST(-3)) -0.000202 -0.024050*** -0.021689 
  (0.01554)  (0.00919)  (0.06200) 
    
D(FCOST(-4))  0.027702** -0.003915 -0.012095 
  (0.01351)  (0.00799)  (0.05391) 
    
C  0.003119***  0.000764  0.038628*** 
  (0.00104)  (0.00062)  (0.00416) 
    
GROWTHGDP -0.078768*** -0.026486** -1.088821*** 
  (0.01815)  (0.01074)  (0.07245) 
    
     R-squared  0.626052  0.554854  0.779324 
 Adj. R-squared  0.579308  0.499211  0.751740 
 Sum sq. resids  0.009458  0.003311  0.150640 
 S.E. equation  0.009190  0.005437  0.036674 
 F-statistic  13.39334  9.971627  28.25226 
 Log likelihood  423.3648  490.0122  247.5975 
 Akaike AIC -6.430941 -7.480507 -3.662952 
 Schwarz SC -6.095013 -7.144580 -3.327024 
 Mean dependent -0.000365 -0.000532 -0.000711 
 S.D. dependent  0.014168  0.007684  0.073605 
    
     Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  2.84E-12  
 Determinant resid covariance  1.94E-12  
 Log likelihood  1171.726  
 Akaike information criterion -17.69648  
    
    
 
 (***) [**] {*} significantly different from zero at (1%), [5%], {10%}  
 
 
The results in Table 1 indicate that for the period since Confederation, the cointegration equation 
(in the first section of the table) conforms well to requirements of debt stationarity.13  First, the 
  coefficient estimate of tax size is .988, insignificantly different from its predicted value of 1 while 
the constant term,    is insignificantly different from zero.
14  Hence the results do not allow us to 
reject the hypothesis that Canadian parliaments have been fiscally prudent in the sense that non-
interest government spending and taxes have been approximately equal over the long run and the 
implied rate of growth of real government debt as a share of GDP has been approximately zero.  
Similarly, the set of error correction coefficients on the short run spending and taxation equations 
have their predicted signs for deficit convergence back towards zero (negative and positive) with 
government expenditures contracting significantly in the face of unexpected deficits.   
 
The positive error correction term on the growth equation is not inconsistent with taxes being  
                                                        
13
 We must be careful not to read too much into the significance of the coefficient estimates because of the 
endogeneity that may exist amongst the variables.  See below for the DOLS adjustments for correlations among 
the variables. 
14
 If we allow only the two I(1) policy variables in the cointegrating equation, the tsize coefficient become .99. Note 
that Eviews does not report the standard error of the constant term in the cointegrating equation, but from later 
results we know this will be insignificantly different from zero.  See the section on the long run below. 
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raised in the face of an unexpected deficit although the coefficient estimate is significantly different 
from zero only at the ten percent significance level.  Overall, the results provide evidence of 
cointegration and deficit convergence and thus are consistent with the hypothesis of long run fiscal 
responsibility in the tax and spending choices made by Canada’s parliament in the period following 
Confederation.   
 
From the cointegrating equation we can also recover the implied values of the share of government 
debt in GDP.  Because FCOST is negative on average over our time period (i.e., the long run real rate 
of interest has exceeded the rate of growth of real output) the data suggest that the stationary long 
run share of debt in GDP,   , is about 95%. 
 
In the equations above, the short run error correction equations model allow for the possibility that 
short run fiscal policy could respond to the business cycle.  The results suggest that government 
spending has responded pro-cyclically over the period as a whole with some tendency for taxation 
to respond in a similar manner.  This suggests that short run counter-cyclical fiscal policy has always 
been used by Canadian governments to smooth the business cycle and such activities have not 
interfered with maintaining a stationary debt to GDP ratio.  The short run error correction process 
also exhibits considerable persistence in both short run policy choices.  A significant portion of both 
government spending and tax increases persist into the second year and call forth reinforcing 
changes in the other policy instrument.   
 
B.   Short run counter-cyclical policy and Keynes 
 
Before proceeding to test whether Keynes had an influence on the long run sustainability of 
government debt in Canada, we first extend the error correction framework to convince ourselves 
that in fact Keynesianism policies were adopted in Canada.  That is, because Keynesianism first and 
foremost implies counter-cyclical fiscal policy, our first approach to testing for Keynes’ influence on 
Canadian fiscal policy is to ask whether the short run adjustment process described by the error 
correction model estimated above changes in any substantive way (on this see also Winer and 
Ferris, 2008).  Formally we do this in the error correction setting by interacting a dummy variable 
for the 1946-2009 time period with real output growth.  It follows that greater counter-cyclical 
intervention as proposed by Keynes would imply a negative coefficient in the interacted spending 
equation (greater spending when growth rates are falling) and a positive coefficient in that tax 
equation (reductions in taxation when growth is falling).  The effect of incorporating Keynesianism 
in this way on the error correction model is shown in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2 
Vector Error Correction Estimates, Canada: 1876 – 2009 
(Standard errors in brackets) 
    
    Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1   
    
    GSIZE(-1)  1.000000   
    
TSIZE(-1) -0.971532***   
  (0.18724)   
    
FCOST(-1)  1.575533***   
  (0.16809)   
    
C  0.010411   
    
    Error Correction: D(GSIZE) D(TSIZE) D(FCOST) 
    
    CointEq1 -0.041137***  0.007384 -0.417098*** 
  (0.01426)  (0.00764)  (0.04417) 
    
D(GSIZE(-1))  0.481064*** -0.117692** -1.306209*** 
  (0.11106)  (0.05947)  (0.34395) 
    
D(GSIZE(-2)) -0.264849**  0.137718* -0.163463 
  (0.13501)  (0.07229)  (0.41811) 
    
D(GSIZE(-3))  0.228370* -0.009745  0.016204 
  (0.13307)  (0.07125)  (0.41210) 
    
D(GSIZE(-4)) -0.220844*** -0.036342 -0.000297 
  (0.08462)  (0.04531)  (0.26207) 
    
D(TSIZE(-1)) -0.107887  0.410084*** -0.549387 
  (0.19738)  (0.10570)  (0.61130) 
    
D(TSIZE(-2)) -0.066170 -0.253332**  0.040345 
  (0.21155)  (0.11328)  (0.65516) 
    
D(TSIZE(-3))  0.292730 -0.048480  0.834157 
  (0.18995)  (0.10172)  (0.58827) 
    
D(TSIZE(-4)) -0.197915 -0.037356 -0.263545 
  (0.15402)  (0.08248)  (0.47700) 
    
D(FCOST(-1))  0.008187 -0.010558  0.042100 
  (0.02215)  (0.01186)  (0.06859) 
    
D(FCOST(-2))  0.042657**  0.000402  0.019100 
  (0.02055)  (0.01101)  (0.06365) 
    
D(FCOST(-3))  0.004125 -0.011678  0.033470 
  (0.01887)  (0.01010)  (0.05844) 
    
D(FCOST(-4))  0.030309* -0.001417  0.004274 
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  (0.01550)  (0.00830)  (0.04799) 
    
C  0.003927  0.000785  0.037568 
  (0.00128)  (0.00068)  (0.00395) 
 [ 3.07770] [ 1.14888] [ 9.50745] 
    
GROWTHGDP -0.050515** -0.013518 -1.092989*** 
  (0.02147)  (0.01150)  (0.06650) 
    
KEYNES*GROWTHGDP -0.082933** -0.000732  0.077372 
  (0.03884)  (0.02080)  (0.12029) 
    
 R-squared  0.301470  0.263154  0.836081 
 Adj. R-squared  0.205342  0.161753  0.813523 
 Sum sq. resids  0.011541  0.003309  0.110691 
 S.E. equation  0.010290  0.005510  0.031867 
 F-statistic  3.136127  2.595181  37.06409 
 Log likelihood  403.2684  481.3406  261.9653 
 Akaike AIC -6.196295 -7.445450 -3.935445 
 Schwarz SC -5.834270 -7.083426 -3.573421 
 Mean dependent  0.001037  0.000427 -0.001015 
 S.D. dependent  0.011543  0.006018  0.073796 
    
     Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  2.67E-12  
 Determinant resid covariance  1.77E-12  
 Log likelihood  1159.037  
 Akaike information criterion -17.72860  
    
    
(***) [**] {*} significantly different from zero at (1%) [5%] {10%} 
 
 
The coefficient estimates in the last lines of column 1 suggest that fiscal spending has not only been 
counter-cyclical in the short run for the entire period since Confederation but that fiscal spending 
has become increasingly counter-cyclical in the time period following 1945.  This is consistent with 
Keynesian prescripts and with evidence found elsewhere for Canada (Winer and Ferris, 2008).  On 
the other hand, the coefficient signs on taxation continue to imply that taxation has been mildly 
pro-cyclical and that the period following Keynes has produced no further effect.  From a broader 
perspective, the results in Table 2 suggest that the presence of Keynesianism in short run fiscal 
policy has had very little effect on the long run cointegration equation and hence on the 
sustainability of government debt in Canada. The coefficient on tax size, .972, is virtually unchanged 
and insignificantly different from one while the constant term remains zero.  Similarly the error 
correction terms and their significance remain largely unaltered as does the pattern of persistence. 
The one suggestion that something may be arising in the longer run is that the estimated size of the 
steady state level of the debt to GDP ratio does rise. 
 
We can then conclude our discussion of the effect of Keynesianism on short run policy by saying 
that that from the perspective of this error correction model (modified to include a counter-cyclical 
role for short run policy) there is evidence that Keynesianism did make fiscal expenditure policy 
more responsive to the business cycle but little evidence that Keynesian counter-cyclical policy has 
impacted negatively on the sustainability of government debt over the long run. 
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C. Did Keynes introduce debt instability into the long run? 
 
While the short and long run fiscal policies adopted by Canada may have resulted in a stable debt to 
GDP ratio over the time period as a whole, there may well be sub-periods when policy choices were 
influenced by factors and/or ideologies that resulted in periods of temporary instability.  Hence in 
this section we first examine whether the time period following Keynes represented a fundamental 
change in the long run relationship linking the expenditure and tax sizes of government. This in turn 
is interpreted as producing a break in the longer run cointegration relationship at or about the time 
Keynesian short run policies were adopted in Canada.  We begin by first presenting a more robust 
test for cointegration across our time period that assumes there were no breaks in the time series 
relationship.  To do so we use the dynamic OLS (DOLS) model of Stock and Watson (1993) over the 
entire 1870-2009 time period.  This provides a correction for correlations that may exist among the 
equations covariates that can bias the standard errors.  The result provides us with a benchmark 
against which we can assess whether Keynesianism has meant a break with previous policy practice 
with respect to government debt.   The result is presented as column (1) in Table 3.   
 
In column (1) of Table 3 the DOLS equation can be seen to produce coefficient estimates that are 
quite similar to the cointegration equations presented earlier in Tables 1 and 2.  In particular, the 
coefficient estimate on TSIZE is still virtually identical to 1 (at 0.975) and the constant term remains 
insignificantly different from zero (indicating no tendency for the federal government debt to GDP 
ratio to grow or shrink in the long run).  The DOLS correction, however, does make a difference to 
the estimate of the size of the long run debt to GDP ratio, suggesting a much smaller 10 percent 
level that is also insignificantly different from zero.15   
 
In columns (2) and (3) we present re-estimates of the long run relationship under two sets of 
assumptions for the period time relevant to test for Keynesianism. Instability in the government 
debt ratio then appear as a break in the constant term of the cointegration equation, with a positive 
constant on Keynes, for example, implying a positive growth rate that would be unsustainable in 
the long run.  Column (2) represents the case where the break point is determined endogenously as 
the initial point in the time interval that minimized the sum of the squared residuals in successive 
DOLS equations.16 This procedure suggested 1946 as the appropriate break point.  On the other 
hand, the choice of a post-war initial time means that Canadian government debt accumulated 
during WW2 would be excluded from time period attributed to Keynes such that the natural 
running down of war-time borrowing might bias the measure against finding any expansionary 
tendency present in Keynesianism. For this reason we redid the estimate using 1939 where the 
build-up of war-time debt would be contained within the Keynesian period.  
 
Neither set of empirical results, however, suggest that a break is present.  In column (2) the 
coefficient sign on Keynes is negative rather than positive (suggesting a tendency to reduce debt 
accumulated from deficits in pre-Keynesian times).  In any case the coefficient estimate is 
                                                        
15
 If we simply ran an OLS regression as our cointegration equation, we would find 
GSIZE = -0.013 + 1.08 TSIZE – 0.016 FCOST   with adj. R
2
= 0.727  and ADF = -6.13   (1% MacKinnon criterion = -4.38). 
               (0.01)    (0.025)         (0.045)                
16
 That is, we experimented with having the break point at 1945 through 1955 and chose the year at which the SSR 
was minimized. 
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insignificantly different from zero.17  In column (3) the coefficient sign does become positive but 
remains both extremely small and insignificantly different from zero.    
 
If the effect of Keynesianism in Canada was to reduce the growth rate of government debt, it would 
need to be reflected in a lower long run size of government debt as a fraction of GDP.  Hence we re-
estimate the equation to allow the size estimate,  , to vary across the time periods by including an 
interactive term on FCOST.  This is presented in column (4).   As that column indicates, allowing the 
estimate of the long run size of government debt as a fraction of GDP does suggest a smaller debt 
ratio consistent with the estimated negative effect of Keynes on the growth rate, but again both 
coefficient estimates are insignificantly different from zero.18  It follows that if we define the post 
war time period as one of Keynesianism (using either break point to define its beginning), we find 
that the data give no support to the hypothesis that the adoption of Keynesianism introduced fiscal 
policies that increased the long run size of government debt.19  
 
The hypothesis that Keynes’ influence on deficits and long run debt has continued into the present 
has often been questioned for Canada.  In particular, much has been made of the observation that 
the accumulation of public debt in Canada throughout the seventies and eighties precipitated a 
strong political reaction (the near elimination of the Progressive Conservative Party) leading to the 
election of the Chr ́tien governments (1993 – 2003) who dedicated their mandate to dramatically 
reducing government deficits and debt by reducing government spending.  In terms of policy 
actions, the ending of Keynesian attitudes towards the deficit and debt may also have been 
signalled by the formal adoption of inflation targeting by the Bank of Canada in 1991.  Alternatively 
it has been argued that that the instability of the Phillips curve in the early 1970’s may have led 
policy makers to become more sceptical of the stimulative potential to debt financing.  Hence in 
column (5) and (6) we present two different tests for the effect of Keynesianism now defined as the 
policy period between 1946 and 1991 (ending with inflation targeting) and between 1939 and 1975 
(to include the war time build-up of government debt to end with the Phillip’s curve debate).  
Somewhat surprising, the data is consistent with the hypothesis that government debt did exhibit 
instability over the longer 1946 to 1991 time period but not over the shorter 1939-1974 time 
interval.20 This suggests that the period of debt instability is associated more with the 1974-1991 
                                                        
17
  Using 1946 as our break point, we used the test proposed by Carrion-I-Silvestre and San ́o (2006) as our test of 
the null hypothesis of cointegration.  Their test statistic is  
    
    
  
 
      ̂  ∑       
 
 
   
   
where    is the time to the break, T is the length of the time interval,  ̂
  is the long run variance of the residuals, 
     
   ∑  ̂    
 
     and An reflects the fact that the estimating equation allows for a shift in the constant term at 
Tb.  To interpret the outcome, we note that the Carrion-I-Silvestre and San ́  test uses the upper tail of the 
distribution so that the null hypothesis of cointegration is rejected only when      
  > critical value.  In our case 
     
       = 0.05867 which is strictly less than the critical value of 0.0840 (for k = 3,      . 
18
 Note that the mean value of FCOST is negative (i.e., r > growth rate) so that the predicted size of the debt share 
is positive not negative. 
19 In this case     
       = 0.07034 which is less than the critical value of 0.0741 (for k = 3,               . 
20
 Having Keynesianism end with the election of the Chretien government in 1993 strengthens the significance of 
the Keynes effect.  For the period as a whole, after allowing or the break between 1946 and 1991,      
       = 
0.0248247 which is strictly less than the critical value of 0.0840 (for k = 3,      .  Hence government debt over 
the entire period is stable. 
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time interval than with any time period beginning near WW2, a time internal not well suited to fit 
into a Keynesian tail. 
 
Table 3 
DOLS equation estimates for Canada:  1876 – 2005 
(HAC standard errors in brackets) 
 (1) 
GSIZE 
 
(2) 
GSIZE 
with break 
in 1946
 
(3) 
GSIZE 
with break 
in 1939 
(4) 
GSIZE
# 
1946 break 
and 
interaction
 
(5) 
GSIZE 
Keynes 
1946-1991 
(6) 
GSIZE 
Keynes 
1939-1975 
       
Constant 
 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.0105 
(0.01) 
-0.003 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
TSIZE 0.975*** 
(0.069) 
1.079*** 
(0.137) 
0.957*** 
(0.271) 
1.140*** 
(0.176) 
0.881*** 
(0.061) 
1.015*** 
(0.056) 
FCOST -0.101 
(0.091) 
-0.090 
(0.07) 
-0.100 
(0.093) 
-0.170 
(0.107) 
-.066 
(0.071) 
-0.165* 
(0.088) 
KEYNES(1946)  -0.013 
(0.016) 
 -0.019 
(0.022) 
  
KEYNES(1939)   0.002 
(0.34) 
   
KEYNES(1946)*FCOST    0.0175   
    (0.110)   
KEYNES(1946-1991)     0.017**  
     (0.007)  
KEYNES(1939-1975)      -0.010 
(0.008) 
       
STATISTICS 
No. of obs. 
Adj. R
2
 
SSR 
Log Likelihood 
 
130 
.869 
0.07815 
297.6 
 
130 
.868 
0.0777 
298.0 
 
130 
.867 
0.0782 
297.62 
 
130 
.870 
0.07567 
299.7 
 
130 
.873 
0.0747 
300.5 
 
130 
.869 
0.077 
298.46 
      
(***) [**] {*} significantly different from zero at (1%) [5%] {10%}. 
This table uses Stock and Watson’s (1993) DOLS estimation to account for potential endogeneity among the explanatory 
variables by including the contemporaneous and four lagged and led values of the first differences of the right side variables 
(with the exception of the dummy variables).  Only the coefficients of the level terms are presented.  
# The SSRs from 1945 through 1950 are, respectively: 0.07814, 0.07769*, 0.07808, 0.07809, 0.07805 and 0.07812 suggesting 
that the break point is at 1946. HAC standard errors use Bartlett kernel with Newey-West fixed bandwidths. 
   
 
It follows that for the case of Canada, Keynesianism either had no effect on the long run evolution 
of government debt (the results in columns (2), (3), (4) and (6)) or, if it had a destabilizing effect (as 
in column (5)), it did so only for a short period before being countered by the political process 
through the electoral and party system.  We can find no evidence that the more aggressive use of 
Keynesian counter-cyclical short run fiscal intervention (as suggested by the error correction 
process) has weakened the fiscally conservative approach that Canadians have typically taken 
towards paying for government services.  This is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that Keynes 
may have played a possibly influential role in broadening the scope and hence the size of 
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government in Canada.  However even if that has been true, as has been argued elsewhere, our 
evidence does not suggest that that larger scale of services by government has been funded by tax 
payments transferred implicitly to future generations.    
 
D.  Extensions 
 
In this section we consider the two alternative tests of the hypothesis that under the parliamentary 
system of government, the concentration of fiscal responsibility in the Prime Minister and his/her 
political party effectively internalizes the fiscal externality associated with having governing terms 
of relatively short duration.  The tests first examine the stationarity of the long run debt ratio in the 
face of a fracturing of responsibility for fiscal stability among more policy makers and second 
examine financial stability when governance process is constrained by having minority status in 
parliament. 
 
In the first three cases, represented as the regression equations in columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 
4, we examine the hypothesis that the creation of a Central Bank divided responsibility for fiscal 
stability between the Department of Finance and the Bank of Canada and this would lead to less 
fiscal stability.  Further, the attempt to focus the objective of the Bank on price stability through the 
adoption of inflation targeting should have led to greater stability.  The first prediction, then, is that 
there would be less budgetary control following the introduction of the Bank of Canada so that the 
coefficient on the Bank of Canada dummy variable (1 following 1935, 0 before) should be positive.   
This is tested for in columns (1) through (3) where it is given weak support. 
 
Table 4 
DOLS equation estimates for Canada, 1876 – 2005 
(HAC standard errors in brackets) 
 (1) 
GSIZE 
DOLS(4) 
(2) 
GSIZE 
DOLS(4) 
(3) 
GSIZE 
DOLS(4) 
(4) 
GSIZE
 
DOLS(4) 
     
Constant 
 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
TSIZE 0.957*** 
(0.192) 
0.864*** 
(0.202) 
0.957*** 
(0.192) 
1.06*** 
(0.219) 
FCOST -0.027 
(0.076) 
-0.091 
(0.078) 
-0.027 
(0.076) 
0.003 
(0.091) 
KEYNES(1946) -0.026 
(0.017) 
-0.037 
(0.023) 
-0.038** 
(0.019) 
-0.044 
(0.031) 
Bank of Canada (1935) 0.041* 0.041* 0.038* 0.037 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.030) 
Letter of Direction 
(1961) 
 0.007 
(0.010) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
Inflation Targeting 
(1991) 
  -0.030*** 
(0.009) 
-0.031** 
(0.015) 
Minority governments    -0.020** 
    (0.010) 
STATISTICS 
No. of obs. 
 
130 
 
130 
 
130 
 
130 
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Adj. R
2
 
SSR 
Log Likelihood 
.871 
0.075 
299.9 
.870 
0.075 
300.3 
.881 
0.068 
306.28 
.889 
0.063 
311.9 
     
(***) [**] {*} significantly different from zero at (1%) [5%] {10%} 
 
 
 
Ambiguity over which policy department would ultimately control aggregate economic policy in 
Canada came to a head in the Coyne Affair, where legislation was introduced defining the role of 
the Bank of Canada in relation to the Department of Finance.  That legislation gave autonomy to the 
Bank in terms of the day-to-day operation of monetary policy while giving to the Department of 
Finance the authority to “direct” the operations of the Bank should its policy practices conflict with 
fiscal policy (under the Department of Finance).  It is unclear whether the 1961 resolution did or did 
not increase Bank independence and thus make policy coordination more or less difficult.  The 
hypothesis that the resolution of the Coyne Affair in 1961 did improve fiscal responsibility is tested 
in columns (2) and (3).  Here the data is more consistent with the hypothesis that the establishment 
of the Bank weakened rather than strengthened fiscal discipline, but the 1961 Directive dummy 
generates a coefficient estimate that is insignificantly different from zero.  Finally column (3) adds 
the hypothesis that the adoption of inflation targeting by the Bank of Canada in 1991 did represent 
a significant delineation of responsibilities between the Bank and the Department of Finance.  This 
would be expected to produce a negative coefficient on the inflation targeting dummy.  The result 
in the last line of column (3) in Table 3 is consistent with that expectation.   
 
Finally, the second type of extension tests the hypothesis that fiscal disciple will be lost when 
political power is split across one or more political parties versus the hypothesis that a smaller 
governing mandate implies greater political competition that enforces greater fiscal discipline.  This 
is tested by the response under minority governments.  The result presented in column (4) suggests 
that at least for Canada the latter is more likely.  Competition in the political system seems to focus 
more the attention of the electorate such that greater fiscal discipline is imposed as parties jockey 
for position in the upcoming election.  This result however is somewhat weak and not robust to all 
equation specifications. 
 
    
5. Conclusions   
 
The Canadian case, with 140 years of good data, and virtually identical basic political institutions, 
provides us a long enough data set to model both short term effects and to search for long term 
equilibrium in budget deficits.  Our first finding is indisputable: despite recurring periods of recession 
and large deficits arising from world wars, there is simply no evidence of an unstable time path of 
deficit financing in Canada corresponding to any of the time periods suggested for instability.  
Keynesianism, for example, which is considered by many Public Choice scholars to be an “enabler” 
(in the language of the clinical psychologists who study drug and alcohol dependency) of weak-
willed politicians who find it easy to spend money but hard to raise taxes, and who can shelter their 
desire to buy votes needed for their re-election behind Keynesian arguments for countercyclical 
spending, seems to have had little impact in Canada -- at least on deficits and the debt to GDP ratio 
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in the long run . Despite their embrace of Keynesianism and a strong role for the state in the post-
WW2 period, Keynesian views do not seem to have sapped the will of Canadian politicians to 
balance budgets over the decades.  
 
Students of public finance (especially those of a Public Choice persuasion) must come to terms with  
the Canadian experience. Is it a fluke (and if so why)? 21  Canada’s success in dealing with budget 
deficits despite its Keynesian leanings poses a serious challenge to those who argue that  
Keynesianism is a source of evil. 22 
 
Our analysis also suggests that while the standard economic story that extols the virtue of independent 
central banks as providing one solution to the “Ulysses and the sirens” problem of the temptation to 
spend faced by politicians, the picture on the ground is much more complex. Yes, central banks often 
have the technocratic expertise lacked by government authorities, and are able to focus on a limited 
number of economic specifics rather than a multiplicity of policy concerns and thus are able to take 
a longer term view resistant to immediate political pressures that mitigates (if not fully solving) 
commitment problems.  On the other hand we also need to understand the potential downside of 
delegation to central banks in terms of the moral hazards of delegation.  By providing what seems 
to be a failsafe of last resort, the existence of an independent central bank may encourage 
politicians to vice, i.e., to bankrupting the public fisc, because they can expect to be bailed out of 
their follies by compensatory (and unpopular) actions taken by bankers who will be seen as 
operating out of the control of these self-same politicians.  In addition, the greater independence of 
the central bank may reduce needed coordination in monetary and fiscal policy.  When we examine 
the role of the Central bank in Canada, it may be that the positive and negative effects of Central 
Bank independence more or less cancel out, perhaps explaining our empirical finding of  little or no 
impact on the stability of budget deficits attributable to the creation of the central bank or to 
changes in its powers.  
 
It is tempting to attribute Canada’s success in developing long run economic stability to its (usual) 
centralization of both political and economic power in the hands of a Prime Minister and a Minister 
of Finance from a party with majority control of the legislature, and to the norm of “responsible 
party government,” where by this we mean joint cabinet responsibility to the parliament which, in 
the case of single party control of the parliament means party responsibility in which the 
government speaks with a unified voice and dissenters are expected to resign from cabinet office. 
The argument, as we laid it out earlier, is quite simple. Centralized control means political leaders 
can link aggregate spending and taxation more easily, and they are also more easily held to account 
                                                        
21
 Here we note that there are other factors we have not explored in depth that are peculiar to Canada ranging 
from a more consensus–oriented political culture, to specific institutions such as the Auditor General's role in 
budgetary review, or the PM’s ability to use a line-item veto, that might help us explain Canadian long run 
budgetary success. 
22
 We repeat, however, a point made earlier, that the present paper’s focus is on deficits. We can have stationarity 
in deficits even if there is long term growth in government size and taxation levels as long as the latter are in 
balance with each other (CF. Winer and Ferris, 2008).  Moreover, our results do not speak to the influence of 
Keynesian ideas on the size of the welfare state or on industrial policy. Thus we do not wish to overstate our 
differences with Buchanan and Wagner (1977) and later authors who blame Keynes for providing an economic 
/intellectual underpinning for many features of the modern state that are repugnant to libertarians or who argue 
that Keynesian policies ultimately hinder economic growth. 
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by the electorate for fiscal performance, thus structuring their re-election incentives in a sharp 
fashion that would seem to incline them to fiscal prudence. 23  But here, too, as with the role of  
central banking, we must be careful. There is no guarantee that “responsible party government” in 
the very technical sense we defined it above, means “responsible” government in the more 
common sense meaning of that term vis-à-vis “sensible” budget outcomes.24   
 
Therefore, rather than trying to do the impossible, that is arguing that data from a single country 
makes the general case for some particular factor or set of factors being central determinants of 
debt stability relative to GDP in all political regimes, we wish instead to conclude simply by pointing 
out that Canada is the white Keynesian swan that contradicts the claim that all Keynesian swans are 
black. 
                                                        
23
By analogy, this argument suggests that concentrating power in the hands of a king (or having unified party 
control in a presidential system where the president served as the dominant party leader) would give us good 
budgetary outcomes –at least in the long run.  But all we have to do is think about the U.S. under unified party rule 
(e.g., most of the George Bush II era from 1994 through 2006) to see that centralized control can also mean great 
irresponsibility as ideology requiring tax reduction as a matter of a quasi -religious faith (combined with the 
influence of special interests directly benefiting from the cuts) dominated Micawberian common sense. On the 
other hand, thinking about divided government in the U.S. under Obama since 2008 reminds us that political 
competition can also lead to irresponsibility as great or even greater as unchecked power of a dominant executive, 
as we see the Republican and Democratic parties engaging in a “blame game” for their failure to agree on ways of 
dealing with the current potentially cataclysmic budget crisis.  (Of course, even with unified party control, we can 
still distinguish the U.S. from Canada in many ways, e.g., checks and balances disperse power and authority across 
the President, House, Senate and Supreme Court, and strong federalism allows for competing centers of power in 
the U.S. For a much more detailed discussion of  U.S-Canada institutional comparisons in the financial area see 
Breton, 1996, chapter 4; for a more general discussion of U.S.-Canada comparisons  with respect to political and 
electoral arrangements see Blais, Bowler and Grofman, forthcoming.) 
24
 As was said to Peter Parker (Spiderman), “with great power comes great responsibility.” But this is a normative 
injunction, not a guarantee of good behaviour by the powerful. For example, If there is anticipated change in party 
control, politicians may seek to hold onto power as long as possible by avoiding spending cuts or tax increases, or 
perhaps by actually cutting taxes, bequeathing to the opposition the unpalatable choice of  having to either raise 
taxes or cut spending  (or do both) to deal with the deficit left them, or face a disaster in the credit markets -- in 
either case shortening the opposition’s  own subsequent tenure in office.  Indeed, in the U.S., a good claim can be 
made that tax reductions under Bush I, and the deficits they generated, was in fact a diabolical plot by Republicans 
to “starve the beast,” and prevent the Democrats when they eventually returned to power from having any ability 
to expand the size of government, rather than a mistaken belief in the “Laffer curve” idea that cutting taxes would 
actually raise government income by improving the incentives of taxpayers to work longer and harder 
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Data Appendix 
 
1.    Economic variables and data sources 
 
The economic data come from several sources: Urquhart and Buckley (1965), Urquhart (1993) and 
Leacy et al. (1983) for the economic variables in the earliest time period (1870 through 1921); and 
Cansim I and II, the statistical databases maintained by Statistics Canada, for these variables in the 
later time period (1921- 2010). More precise definitions and their sources are given below. 
 
Bank of Canada = 1 for 1935 onwards; 0 otherwise. 
D1961 = Legislation authorizing the “letter of direction” concerning conflict between the 
Government of Canada and the Bank of Canada = 1 from 1961 onwards; 0 otherwise 
 
GDP = gross domestic product in current dollars. 1870-1926: GNP from Urquhart (1993: 24-25) (in 
millions); 1927-1995: CANSIM I D11000; 1996-2009: CANSIM II V3800002 (aggregated from 
quarterly data).  Note GNP and GDP data are not available before 1870 so that GDP numbers were 
calculated by assuming that the tax size of government remained constant between 1867 and 1869.  
Since data is available on federal government tax revenue, a value for GDP was implied. 
 
Keynes = 1 for 1946 through 2009; 0 otherwise 
 
P = GNP deflator before 1927 and GDP deflator after (1986 = 100). 1870-1926: Urquhart, (1993), 24-
25; 1927-1995 (1986=100): Cansim data label D14476; 1996-2006 Cansim D140668.  All indexes 
converted to 1986 = 100 basis.   
 
RGDP = real GDP = GDP/P. 
 
GrowthGDP = growth of GDP = LnRGDP – LnRGDP(-1).   
 
GOV = total federal government expenditure net of interest payments.1870-1989: Gillespie (1991: 
284-286); 1990-1996: Public Accounts of Canada 1996-97: 1997-2000: Federal Government Public 
Accounts, Table 3 Budgetary Revenues Department of Finance web site, September 2001. To this 
we add the return on government investment (ROI) originally subtracted by Gillespie for his own 
purposes.  Expenditure is net of interest paid to the private sector. Data on ROI: 1870 to 1915:  
Public Accounts (1917: 64); 1915-1967: Dominion Government Revenue and Expenditure: Details of 
Adjustments 1915-1967 Table W-1; 1916-17 to 1966-67: Securing Economic Renewal - The Fiscal 
Plan, Feb 10, 1988, Table XI; 1987-88 to 1996-97: Public Accounts 1996, Table 2.2. Interest on the 
Debt (ID) was subtracted out (with adjustment for interest paid to the Bank of Canada (BCI) 
ultimately returned to the government). Data on ID: 1870-1926: Leacy et al. (1983: Series H19-34): 
Federal Government budgetary expenditures, classified by function, 1867-1975; 1926-1995: Cansim 
D11166. 1996-2000: Cansim D18445. Finally, data for BCI: copied by hand from the Annual Reports 
of The Bank of Canada, Statement of Income and Expense, Annually, 1935-2000. Net Income paid to 
the Receiver General (for the Consolidated Revenue Acct).  Note: all government data are 
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converted from fiscal to calendar years, and allows for a change in the definition of the fiscal year in 
1906/07, as described in Gillespie (1991: Appendix C). 
 
GSIZE = non-interest federal government, direct public expenditure as a fraction of GDP =  
GOV/GDP. 
 
TAXES = the sum of the fourteen different categories of taxes collected in Canada.  The fourteen 
categories include: 1. Custom Duties - Customs Import Duties (in Public Accounts); 2. 
ExciseDuties- Excise Duties (in Public Accounts), included in ExciseTaxes after 1990; 3.Sales 
Tax - Sales Tax (in Public Accounts).  GST replaces Sales Tax from 1991;  4. Excise Taxes -Other (in 
Public Accounts), includes Excise Duties after 1990; 5. Personal Income Tax - Income Tax, Personal 
(in Public Accounts); 6.Corporate Income Tax - Income Tax, Corporate (in Public Accounts); 7.Non 
Resident - Non-resident Income Tax (in Public Accounts), included in Other Income Tax Revenues 
after 1994; 8.Excess Profits - Energy Taxes (in Public Accounts); 9.Estates Taxes - 0 after 1977; 
10.Post Office Revenues - 0 after 1983; 11.Misc. Revenues - Other Non-Tax Revenues (in Public 
Accounts); 12. Special Recipient and Other Credits - Refunds of previous year’s expenditure, 
Services and service fees, Privileges, licences and permits, Proceeds from Sales, Bullion and coinage. 
Excludes  premium and discount on exchange. This category listed as Misc. Revenues after 1989; 13. 
UIC Taxes - Unemployment Insurance Contribution, Government Contribution (in Public Accounts); 
14. Old Age Security - 0 after 1977; Sources: 1868-1989: W. Irwin Gillespie, Tax, Borrow and Spend: 
Financing Federal Spending in Canada, 1867 - 1990, Carleton University Press, 1991, pp.284-286; 
1996-97, Public Accounts of Canada; 1997-2000: Federal Government Public Accounts, Table 3 
Budgetary Revenues Department of Finance web site, September 2001.  
 
TSIZE = federal tax revenue as a fraction of GDP = TAXES/GDP 
 
r = long term government bond rate as a fraction: 1870-1913: Rich (1988),  Average Yield on 
Dominion Government Bonds - Table 7-4, p.201; 1914-1919. Homer (1973) Province of Ontario 
Bonds Annual Average, %,  p. 484; 1920 - 1958: Homer (1973), Long Term Dominion of Canada 
Dollar Bonds Annual Average, % p. 484; 1959-1995: Gov’t of Can. Bond Yield Ave 5-10 year, Cansim 
series B14030; 1995-2001: updated by hand as average of 12 months Cansim B14030. See: also 
Sidney Homer. (1977). A History of Interest Rates. Rutgers University Press. 
 
realrate = real rate of interest on federal debt, as a fraction = r – (LnP – LnP(-1)) 
 
FCOST = GrowthGDP – realrate 
 
 
2.    Political variables and data sources   
 
MINORITY = 1 if the governing party was part of a minority government; = 0 otherwise.  There have 
been fourteen minority governments in Canada since 1867. 
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Sources:  
Canadian Parliamentary guide, 1997, 2002; Thirty Seventh General Election 2000, Elections Canada 
2001. 
Beck, Murray, J., 1968, Pendulum of Power Prentice Hall of Canada, Scarborough. 
Scarrow, Howard A., 1962,  Canada Votes: A Handbook of Federal and Provincial Election Data, 
Hauser Printing Company, New Orleans. 
 
 
3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Estimation, 1870 – 2009 
 
                                  MINORITY    GSIZE         TSIZE            FCOST         GROWTHGDP    REAL RATE 
Mean 0.137 0.116 0.119 -0.008 3.61 2.76 
Max 1.000 0.433 0.256 0.282 15.77 17.56 
Min 0.000 0.035 0.046 -0.177 -11.80 11.14 
Std. Dev. 0.345 0.073 0.058 0.072 4.92 4.43 
ADF -5.0*** -2.03 -1.94 -6.77*** -8.96*** -6.62*** 
***(**) significant at 1% (5%). ADF is adjusted Dickey-Fuller statistic for the null of no 
cointegration 
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